School Choice Is Constitutional

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School Choice Is Constitutional (NAPSA)—Whether you are for or against school vouchers, this article will help clear up many of the myths and misperceptions surrounding the issue. The series begins with a brief on the recent Supreme Court ruling upholding the constitutionality of the Cleveland voucher program. While voucher opponents have long contended that publicly funded vouchers are unconstitutional, the first case squarely posing the constitutional question reached the U.S. Supreme Court in the 2001 term. On June 27, 2002, the High Court handed downits opinion in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, upholding the constitutionality of Cleveland’s voucher program against the claim that it violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. A Program of True Private Choice Writing for the Court’s majority, Chief Justice William Rehnquist placed the Cleveland ruling in a line of cases reaching back to 1983, drawing a distinction between “Government programs that provide aid directly to religious schools...and programs of true private choice, in which government aid reaches religious schools only as a result of the genuine and independent choices of private individuals.” Neutral Toward Religion The Cleveland voucher program, the Court ruled, “is neutral in all respects toward religion, and is part of Ohio’s general and multifaceted undertaking to provide educational opportunities to children in a failed school district. The only preference in the program is for low-income families, who receive greater assistance and have priority for admission. No reasonable observer would think a neutral program of private choice carries with it the imprimaturof government endorsement.” Satisfies Constitutional Concerns The Court noted that Cleve- Pe Sp Eis oe ~ = ee Many feel the Court’s ruling on publicly funded vouchers enhancesthe spirit of the U.S. Constitution. land public schools had been placed understate control in 1995 for failing “to meet any of the state’s 18 standards for minimal acceptable performance.” In dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens argued that the Court ought to give public school reform efforts more time to take effect before “relying on Cleveland’s educational crisis as a reason for state financed religious education.” Justice Clarence Thomas countered that “Converting the 14th Amendment from a guaran- tee of opportunity to an obstacle against education reform distorts our constitutional values and disserves those in greatest need.” The Court’s Cleveland ruling clears the constitutional cloud under which voucher programs have operated since their inception, recognizing that a program that is truly neutral between private, public and religious school choice, in which students’ school attendance is determined by the independent choice of individual parents, does not offend, and in fact enhances, the spirit of the U.S. Constitution. More information about this issue is available by visiting the Milton and Rose D. Friedman Foundation Web site www.friedmanfoundation.org. at